Nah, really, I'll fix this shit. I can't prevent tsunamis, but I'll kick local assholes in the balls that withold aid, like they're doing now. Here, I have something for you folks. It's not all good there.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aceh: An Interview with Allan Nairn
Allan Nairn interviewed by Derrick O'Keefe
Seven Oaks Magazine
January 04, 2005
Derrick O'Keefe: Could you tell us the latest with
respect to the devastation caused by last month's
earthquake and tsunami, specifically in Aceh?
Allan Nairn: Well, the coastal areas of Aceh have been
crushed by the earthquake and the tsunami. Large parts
of Banda Aceh are under water; they've become part of
the sea. The west coast is hardest hit and whole
villages are leveled. But this is not the first
catastrophe to hit Aceh. Previously, it was devastated
by unnecessary and preventable poverty. Aceh is rich in
resources; it's one of the world's main natural gas
producers. It supplies much of the natural gas for
South Korea and Japan, and yet the revenues have gone
to Exxon Mobil and the central government in Jakarta,
with almost nothing left for the poor of Aceh. And as a
result, we've seen malnutrition and undernourishment
levels among the children of Aceh running as high as 40
percent.
O'Keefe: A number of activist groups in the United
States have concerns that the Indonesian government
will hamper disaster relief efforts, and also that they
will exploit the situation to further repress Acehnese
political activists. Do you know of, or see evidence of
this taking place in Aceh?
Nairn: Well, the Indonesian military is doing that as
we speak. They are continuing to attack villages, more
than a dozen villages in East Aceh and North Aceh away
from the coast, even though General Susilo, the
president of Indonesia, announced that they would be
lifting the state of siege. He hasn't actually done it.
And an Indonesian military spokesman came out and said,
we will keep attacking until the President tells us to
stop.'
The military is also impeding the flow of aid. They've
commandeered a hanger at the Banda Aceh airport, where
they are taking control of internationally shipped in
supplies. We just got a report this afternoon that the
distribution of supplies is being done in some towns
and villages only to people who hold the red and
white,' which is a special ID card issued to Acehnese
by the Indonesian police. You have to go to a police
station to get one of these ID cards, and it is only
issued to people who the police certify as not being
opponents of the army, not being critics of the
government. Of course many people are afraid to go and
apply for such a card.
There's been a tremendous outpouring from the public;
all over the world people are giving donations. But
most of these donations are being channeled through the
UN agencies or through the big mainstream charities.
There's a major problem. Those agencies and charities
all have contracts with the Indonesian government,
contracts which oblige them to either channel funds
through the government or work in concert with the
government, which means that government officials and
army officers can steal the aid, and there are already
indications that this is happening. And even that aid
which is not stolen may be used in a way to consolidate
military control over the population.
O'Keefe: What is the background to the political
conflict in Aceh?
Nairn: Really the second wave of devastation to hit
Aceh was the Indonesian military. Aceh is one of the
most repressive places in the world. They have been
under de facto Martial Law for years. Now,
international relief workers and foreign journalists
are pouring in, but, until the tsunami, they were
banned by the Indonesian military. The reason is that
the Acehnese want a free vote; they want a referendum
which would give them the option of choosing
independence from the central government and Indonesia.
In 1999, there was a demonstration in front of the
Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh which drew anywhere from 400
000 to a million people. That's anywhere from 10
percent to a quarter of the entire Acehnese population
of 4 million. In proportional terms, that makes it one
of the largest political demonstrations in recent world
history. The military responded to this demonstration
by crushing the civilian political movement that was
calling for referendum - assassinating, disappearing,
raping activists, and continuing with the massacres
that had already dotted Aceh with mass graves before
the tsunami created new mass graves.
The Indonesian military actually encourages the armed
conflict that is going on between them and the GAM
(Aceh Freedom Movement), which is an armed rebel pro-
independence group. The Indonesian military
occasionally sells weapons to the GAM. The military
likes this war because, one, they can't be defeated
militarily, and two, because it gives them a rationale
for their political existence. The Indonesian military
is one of the most repressive and corrupt in the world
and, after the fall of Suharto, it became extremely
unpopular in Indonesia - there was a strong popular
movement against it. But by prolonging the war in Aceh,
the Indonesian armed forces are able to say to the
public, see, we're facing an armed rebellion, you need
us to protect you.' And then third, the war in Aceh is
a rich source of corruption for the Indonesian military
officers. They do systematic extortion of business,
small business and the poor, so they want to stay
there. And they crush the civilian movement to avoid a
political contest that they might well lose, and they
encourage a military fight which they can only win.
O'Keefe: It sounds very much as if conditions for the
people of Aceh are as bad today as they were under the
Suharto dictatorship. When did the conflict between the
independence movement of Aceh and the government of
Jakarta begin, and what are its origins?
Nairn: Well, Aceh as a nation predates Indonesia. It
was actually an ancient kingdom that ruled the area
that is now Aceh as well as a lot of what is now
Malaysia. When Indonesia came into being after World
War II, with the uprising against the Dutch
colonialists, Aceh played a leading role in fighting
off the Dutch. And the Acehnese made a bargain with the
other islands that came to form Indonesia that they
would join the new country of Indonesia in exchange for
substantial internal autonomy, and freedom to go their
own way. But very quickly the central government in
Jakarta reneged on that deal, and the Acehnese became
quite unhappy. And then when Suharto and his army
seized power in the 1965-67 period, and staged
massacres all across Indonesia to consolidate their
power, it began a period of military repression of the
pro-independence movement in Aceh. The Acehnese tried
for years the political route, and it didn't work. Then
in the 1970s the GAM, the armed rebel movement, was
formed. But even before they existed the Indonesian
military and police were killing Acehnese civilians.
O'Keefe: What are some of the connections between U.S.
corporate interests and the Indonesian military
repression in Aceh?
Nairn: There's one main connection, and that's Exxon
Mobil. Their natural gas facility dominates the
Acehnese economy, by way of extraction. They also have
Indonesian troops garrisoned on their property. The
Exxon Mobil company pays protection money to the
Indonesian military and the military buries bodies of
its victims on Exxon Mobil lands. The revenues from
Exxon Mobil are a mainstay of the Jakarta central
government. Not much of it finds its way back to Aceh.
O'Keefe: As someone who operates in the United States,
what did you think of the spectacle over the past
couple of days of U.S. military helicopters delivering
aid, in sharp contrast to U.S. military operations over
the past couple of years in Iraq, for instance?
Nairn: It's bitterly ironic. You don't even have to go
as far a field as Iraq to get an illustration of the
role the U.S. has played. The Indonesian military is a
long-time client of the U.S. The U.S. supported the
military as they were bringing Suharto to power, as
they were carrying out a massacre of anywhere from 400
000 to a million Indonesians during 1965-67. The U.S.
gave the green light to the invasion of East Timor by
the Indonesian military, which wiped out a third of the
Timorese population, 200 000 people.
It's only as a result of grassroots lobbying in the
U.S. after the '91 Dili massacre that the U.S. Congress
stepped in and cut off much of the U.S. military aid to
Indonesia. But this was done over the objection of the
U.S. executive, over the objection of the first
President Bush, and then President Clinton, and now the
current President Bush. And there will be a major
battle coming up in the U.S. Congress as Bush tries to
restore the military aid now. But hopefully the public
will bring enough pressure to bear on Congress that
Congress will resist.
But the U.S. has deep complicity in the massacres over
the years in Indonesia, in occupied Timor, currently in
Papua and very recently and currently in Aceh. So it's
bitterly ironic to see U.S. helicopters coming ashore
in the role of deliverers of relief.
O'Keefe: You've mentioned some problems with the
established NGOs working in Indonesia and Aceh. Is
there a way that people can contribute to the relief
effort, and to efforts to raise awareness about the
situation in Aceh more generally?
Nairn: Yes, fortunately there is a way around the
problem of Indonesian military cooptation of the UN and
big mainstream relief channels. And that is to give
directly to the grassroots Acehnese groups, which have
been working for years with people in the refugee camps
and which - even though their people are at risk - can
deliver aid directly to the public because they do not
have these contractual relationships with the
Indonesian government and military. One such group is
the People's Crisis Center (PCC) of Aceh, which for
years has been going into the re-education camps,'
which are set up by the Indonesian military - farmers
are driven off their land, put into these camps to have
their thoughts cleansed by military propagandists. And
the children in these camps were often going hungry,
not getting clean water, not getting schooling, and
people from the PCC would come in and try to aid the
children and give some education and some subsistence.
And now they're working on disaster relief. Over the
years their organizers were often targeted by the
military, but they've persisted, they've been very
brave.
Now the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) of the United
States is channeling aid to the PCC and similar on-the-
ground Acehnese groups. So if people want to donate,
they can go to the ETAN U.S. website, which is
www.etan.org.
http://www.zmag.org/ZNET.htm